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Abstract—Handling qualities embody those qualities or 
characteristics of an aircraft that govern the ease and precision 
with which a pilot is able to perform the tasks required in 
support of an aircraft role. These same qualities are as critical, 
if not more so, in the operation of spacecraft.  
A research, development, test, and evaluation process was put 
into effect to identify, understand, and interpret the 
engineering and human factors principles which govern the 
pilot-vehicle dynamic system as they pertain to space 
exploration missions and tasks. Toward this objective, piloted 
simulations were conducted at the NASA Langley Research 
Center and Ames Research Center for earth-orbit proximity 
operations and docking and lunar landing.  
These works provide broad guidelines for the design of 
spacecraft to exhibit excellent handling characteristics. In 
particular, this work demonstrates how handling qualities 
include much more than just stability and control 
characteristics of a spacecraft or aircraft. Handling qualities 
are affected by all aspects of the “pilot-vehicle dynamic 
system,” including the motion, visual and aural cues of the 
vehicle response as the pilot performs the required operation 
or task. A holistic approach to spacecraft design, including the 
use of manual control, automatic control, and pilot 
intervention/supervision is described. The handling qualities 
implications of design decisions are demonstrated using these 
pilot-in-the-loop evaluations of docking operations and lunar 
landings. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1 
2. BACKGROUND ................................................... 2 
3. PROXIMITY OPERATIONS AND DOCKING ........ 2 
4. LUNAR LANDING HQ IMPLICATIONS ............... 6 
5. HANDLING QUALITIES FOR AUTOMATION .... 16 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS ................................. 17 
REFERENCES ....................................................... 17 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................... 19 
BIOGRAPHIES ...................................................... 19 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Handling qualities embody those qualities or characteristics 
of a vehicle that govern the ease and precision with which a 
pilot is able to perform a required task or operation [1]. 
These same qualities are as critical, if not more so, in the 
operation of spacecraft [2].  
The requirement that manual control be provisioned is 
codified in NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements for Space 
Systems [3]. Under Item 3.4.1, “The crewed space system 
shall provide the capability for the crew to manually control 
the flight path and attitude of their spacecraft...” This 
requirement was established as “a fundamental element of 
crew survival. Manual control means that the crew can 
bypass the automated guidance of the vehicle to interface 
directly with the flight control system to effect any flight 
path within the capability of the flight control system.”  
Further, under Item 3.4.2, “the crewed spacecraft shall 
exhibit Level 1 handling qualities (Handling Qualities 
Rating (HQR) 1, 2 and 3), as defined by the Cooper-Harper 
Rating Scale, during manual control of the spacecraft's 
flight path and attitude.” The primary rationale is that Level 
1 handling qualities will allow the crew to effectively 
control the spacecraft when necessary for mission 
completion or to prevent a catastrophic event.  
These requirements are sufficient motivation to properly 
attend to the design of inherently good spacecraft handling 
qualities. However, the depth and breadth implicit in these 
requirements is not often appreciated.   
Handling qualities are not defined only by the control 
system design characteristics of the vehicle; they also 
include the motion, visual and aural cues of the vehicle 
response. This influence spans across the design of the 
manual and automatic control modes, cockpit displays, 
control inceptors (e.g., tactile cueing), crew station design, 
crew resources management (including mission control) and 
mission operations.  
A holistic approach to spacecraft design, including the use 
of manual control, automatic control, and pilot intervention 
is outlined to ensure excellent handling qualities. Spacecraft 
handling qualities research is described which highlight the 
implications of handling qualities on spacecraft design and 
operations and capture pertinent lessons-learned for future 
vehicles, including commercial crew vehicles.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20120003520 2019-08-30T19:40:30+00:00Z
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2. BACKGROUND  
Handling qualities are illustrated using the concept of the 
“pilot-vehicle dynamic system” (Figure 1); the elements of 
which form a closed-loop system, driven by a piloting task 
or mission objective. The pilot acts as the system controller. 
The pilot’s role is to serve as “the decision-maker of what is 
to be done, the comparator of what’s happening vs. what he 
wants to happen, and the supplier of corrective inputs to the 
aircraft controls to achieve what he desires” [4].  
 
Figure 1: Pilot-Vehicle Dynamic System [4] 
Handling qualities reflect the precision with which the pilot 
can accomplish the given task (as the controller of the 
closed-loop system) and the associated pilot workload and 
compensation to meet this level of performance. Although 
the “augmented aircraft” – the vehicle’s dynamic response 
characteristics augmented by its flight control system – 
would logically be the primary determinant of handling 
qualities, the other system factors may be equally 
influential. These cues (such as the presence or absence of 
motion cues and the environment, e.g., external visibility, 
control upsets, aural cues, and pilot stressors) are the 
feedbacks that the pilot uses to perceive the vehicle response 
and meet the demands of the task.   
Modifications or changes in individual elements within this 
closed-loop system may be compensated by the adaptive 
pilot, but possibly at a cost of pilot workload or changes in 
task performance. These effects cannot be segregated; thus, 
handling qualities must really be evaluated in the aggregate 
[4,5]. Empirical and historical data can provide perspective 
and estimates on the effects of changing elements within the 
system but the only truly accurate measure is to evaluate the 
aggregate closed-loop system.   
Spacecraft Handling Qualities 
Our foundational understanding of handling qualities (HQ) 
and the pilot-vehicle dynamic system is rooted in the 
aeronautics domain. Although the physics of the systems are 
obviously different, the fundamentals are no different and of 
no less importance for spacecraft.  
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) initiated a multi-centered Spacecraft Handling 
Qualities project in 2007. This project was designed to 
provide data and guidelines for the design, development, 
test, and evaluation of NASA’s Constellation Program 
platforms as well as all future NASA and other government 
agency and commercial spacecraft.  
This work was spurred on, in part, by the legacy established 
by Gemini and Apollo where significant research was 
conducted for the parametric investigation of what drives 
spacecraft handling qualities. The Apollo and Gemini work 
investigated, for example, the handling qualities influence of 
such parameters as:  
• Spacecraft attitude control mode, control power, target 
lighting and target oscillatory motion [6, 7]; 
• “Remote” docking using closed-circuit television [8]; 
• Visual aids, in day and night conditions, to align to a 
docking target [9]; 
• Hand controllers, instruments, and control modes [10]; 
• Visual simulation compared to “full-size” docking [11]; 
• Visual aids and attitude control modes in lunar orbit 
[12]; 
• Handling qualities design requirements and control law 
types for lunar landing [13,14]. 
For Apollo and Gemini, this work was critical since 
experience for the required spacecraft operations was non-
existent.  
One could argue that a wealth of data and experience are at 
hand today so new work in spacecraft handling qualities is 
not needed. The counter argument is that there is not a 
sufficient basis from which to extrapolate to new vehicles, 
operations, and operating conditions and mission plans. As 
an example, when the Space Shuttle was being developed, 
proximity operations and docking issues were assumed to be 
a lower priority (i.e., had less technical risk) compared to 
other system development tasks because of the Apollo and 
Gemini legacy [15]. This lack of initial concern for 
proximity operations and docking resulted in “complex 
operational work-arounds over the life of the [Shuttle] 
program.” Stepping back and fully considering the past is 
the only way to avoid reliving history. 
To avoid reliving this past, a research, development, test, 
and evaluation process was initiated to identify, understand, 
and interpret the engineering and human factors principles 
which govern the pilot-vehicle dynamic system (i.e., 
handling qualities) as they pertain to space exploration 
missions and tasks for Constellation and all future NASA 
and other government agency and commercial spacecraft.  
3. PROXIMITY OPERATIONS AND DOCKING 
The Spacecraft Handling Qualities work initially 
investigated proximity operations and docking issues, 
principally focused around two human-in-the-loop 
experiments each, conducted at both the Ames Research 
Center (ARC) and Langley Research Center (LaRC). 
Subsequent to this work, additional activity was conducted 
at NASA Johnson Manned Space Flight Center, focused 
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specifically on Orion/Crew Exploration Vehicle handling 
qualities investigations [16]. 
These works revealed numerous design implications and 
design guidance which capture the influence of handling 
qualities on a spacecraft design for proximity operations and 
docking. 
Piloting Task 
A complete task definition is required, not just of the 
primary control task, but also of any critical auxiliary tasks. 
For proximity operations and docking, it was repeatedly 
stressed by Shuttle commanders that the docking task is a 
crew effort. Delegation of tasks across the crew was 
required. In lieu of this - for our single pilot evaluations - 
automation was added to replicate some of these crew 
functions, such as using a “range to docking” automated 
call-out. Task analysis should be conducted to appropriately 
define the “complete” piloting task; otherwise, false or 
misleading assessments may result. 
The concept of operations for rendezvous, proximity 
operations and docking, including docking mechanisms, are 
first-order influences on handling qualities and the resultant 
on-orbit control design. This fact is self-evident because an 
evaluation pilot is rating the vehicle’s handling 
characteristics for a given task or mission task element.  
In conducting handling qualities evaluations, the criticality 
of the designing appropriate tasks cannot be over-
emphasized. History has shown that latent handling qualities 
deficiencies are exposed by using piloting tasks that create 
“stress cases” – those conditions that necessitate closed-loop 
control of the vehicle to achieve the task objective. The task 
should not be unreasonable, but it is usually one which 
would not often occur. An example in the aviation domain is 
the offset landing task. This task is within the capabilities of 
the aircraft and is “legal” to perform, but operationally, 
pilots will usually perform a go-around rather than 
correcting back to the centerline of the runway in an attempt 
to land. Using this task to evaluate handling qualities 
exposes the pilot-vehicle dynamic system to a high 
bandwidth task for the purposes of exposing potentially 
latent deficiencies.  
In proximity operations and docking, this same approach 
was used. The initial condition on a +V-bar docking 
approach to the International Space Station (ISS) was offset 
by 2.5 ft from the docking axis [17,18]. This offset required 
the evaluation pilot to laterally and vertically reacquire the 
docking axis. This “stress case” was validated as a good HQ 
task by experienced Shuttle commanders as one that 
stressed closed-loop control without completely diverging 
from the concept of operations. Operationally, this task 
mirrors the aviation-domain offset landing task where the 
offset is at the edge of the allowable ISS docking corridor 
that would likely, but not necessarily, require the vehicle to 
stop the approach and reposition before attempting docking.  
Desired and Adequate Performance Standards 
Equally critical to the task definition are the required task 
performance standards. The performance standards must be: 
a) germane to the required operation or task as they apply to 
the actual mission; b) include variables or outcomes 
controllable by the pilot; c) observable to the pilot; and, d) 
sufficiently demanding that high closed-loop pilot-vehicle 
“task bandwidth” is required to aptly stress and test the 
handling qualities characteristics [2].  
Once the task is defined, ensuring that closed-loop control 
by the pilot is required, the “task bandwidth” is modulated 
by: 1) the precision that is demanded of the pilot-vehicle 
performance; and, 2) the time to complete the task.  
1) Task Performance—The task precision is dictated by the 
mission. For proximity operations and docking, desired and 
adequate docking performance standards were established 
based on the anticipated docking hardware, as shown in 
Table 1. The adequate docking standard was defined by the 
successful docking performance limits. Adequate 
performance means that the task can still be accomplished; 
albeit, without significant margin for error. On the other 
hand, desired performance means that the task can be 
accomplished with significant margin. Changing the 
docking method, changes the task and hence, the handling 
qualities issues and design challenges.  
2) Time Constraint—A time constraint may be inherent for 
certain tasks. If it is not naturally part of a task, it must be 
imposed; otherwise, this becomes an uncontrolled variable 
in the task that can result in potentially adverse 
consequences.   
For proximity operations and docking, a time constraint was 
established by specifying an approach and docking closure 
rate (e.g., 0.1 ft/sec). This closure rate was included as part 
of the desired and adequate performance standards. The 
desired performance standard was met if the closure rate for 
the duration of the task was held within ±25% of the target 
value. The adequate performance standard was within the 
expected performance limits of the docking mechanism.  
Table 1: Docking Task Performance Standards 
 Desired 
Performance 
Adequate  
Performance 
Radial Offset ±1.5 in ±1.5 to ±3.2 in 
Roll/Pitch/Yaw 
Angle 
±2.0 deg ±2.0 to ±3.0 deg 
Axial Closure 
Rate (0.1 ft/s) 
0.075 to 0.125 ft/s 0 to 0.075 ft/s OR  
0.125 to 0.15 ft/s 
Radial (Linear) 
Rate 
±0.0325 ft/s ±0.0325 to  
±0.1125 ft/s 
Roll/Pitch/Yaw 
(Angular) Rate 
±0.05 deg/sec ±0.05 to  
±0.15 deg/sec 
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The required HQs are thus established by the precision 
within which the task must be completed for mission 
success. These standards were based on data relative to the 
anticipated docking mechanisms for Constellation and those 
anticipated for the commercial off-the-shelf platforms [19]. 
If the docking mechanism or operational concepts are 
changed, the HQ standards and design challenges will also 
change. 
Handling Qualities Influences 
One predominate handling qualities factor in proximity 
operations and docking is the rotational coupling of the 
vehicle due to translational inputs [17,18]. This effect is 
illustrated in Figure 2 using a simplistic example where the 
relationship between reaction control system (RCS) jet 
longitudinal location varies with respect to the vehicle 
center-of-mass (CM). If the RCS jet is at the same x-axis 
(body) position, translational RCS jet firings pass through 
the CM and do not introduce spacecraft rotation changes 
(i.e., uncoupled or “neutral coupling”). The left- and right-
hand sketches in Figure 2 place the RCS jets forward or aft 
of the CM x-axis (body) position so translational RCS jet 
pair firings introduce either “adverse” or “proverse” 
spacecraft rotation changes, respectively. For a 
configuration with adverse coupling, a command to translate 
the vehicle right would cause an initial yaw to the left (as 
viewed through the centerline camera), seemingly counter to 
the translation command. Conversely, in a case with 
proverse coupling, a command to translate right would 
effect a yaw rotation in the right direction (as viewed 
through the centerline camera), but seemingly additive to 
the translation command. This coupling effect may also 
occur in the lateral translation/yaw rotational axes as well.  
Six Degree-of-Freedom (6 DOF) Control HQs 
Rotation coupling effects were investigated during Apollo 
and Gemini and careful RCS design enabled successful 
manual control of proximity operations and docking.  
These issues were reevaluated with representative current-
day RCS thruster sizes [17]. The HQ data show that desired 
performance can generally be obtained without coupling, 
but six degree-of-freedom (6 DOF) control is higher 
workload and thus, not satisfactory without improvement 
(not Level 1 HQRs). Adequate HQ performance (Level 2 
HQRs) is generally possible within the range of coupling 
effects evaluated. Large pulse widths (minimum RCS jet 
firing times) and large thruster sizes, coupled with adverse 
rotational coupling can create Level 3 HQRs. Coupling was 
correlated (statistically significant) to fuel usage; lower 
coupling resulted in better HQRs and less fuel being 
expended in the operation.   
For instance, on occasion, the desirability or need for 
manual rotational (6 DOF) control was questioned; 
however, the more senior Shuttle commanders quickly 
dispelled any movement toward eliminating this capability. 
Their experience showed that, while not often used, manual 
rotational control enabled many orbital Shuttle missions.   
Three Degree-of-Freedom (3 DOF) Control HQs 
The introduction of rate command/attitude hold (RCAH) 
control laws to maintain spacecraft attitude (allowing the 
pilot to perform translational inputs only) can significantly, 
but not completely obviate rotational coupling effects. 
Coupling effects may still be apparent as the vehicle slices 
through the selected attitude hold deadbands [18,19]. 
As one pilot observed, the “vehicle is … going to hold 
attitude plus or minus the deadbands, but I don’t feel like 
I’m really in control.” Pilot compensation was either to: a) 
ignore the deadbands (there were cockpit indications of 
imminent deadband-limit RCS firing); b) offset the docking 
alignment in anticipation of a deadband firing; or, c) correct 
for them immediately when they occur. In either case, a 
handling qualities penalty is incurred, resulting in a net 
improvement in HQRs for 3 DOF control, but not “night-
and-day” differences [17]. 
Feedforward Compensation 
Pulse-width-modulation-type feedforward compensation can 
actuate RCS firing durations and combinations to reduce 
residual RCS translation-to-rotational coupling effects 
[20,21]. 
Pilot-in-the-loop testing vividly demonstrated the benefits of 
these systems. Feedforward compensation provided Level 1 
HQRs by virtually eliminating translational-rotational 
coupling effects [20]. 
Handling qualities tests were performed with feedforward 
compensation in both nominal and off-nominal conditions 
such as with intentionally introduced inaccuracies or 
impurities associated with the controller (e.g., by offsetting 
the CM from the design position, varying the thruster output 
from nominal value, etc.). In all cases tested, the 
feedforward compensator handling qualities were largely 
unaffected [21]. 
Further failure mode effects testing is needed, however. The 
concern is the handling qualities “cliff” that may be lurking.  
Particular emphasize should include the real-world effects 
of thruster size and cycle times and how these issues 
manifest themselves into residues from perfect 
compensation and latencies caused by duration times to 
complete the pulse width commands. The hope is that the 
control law compensation will be robust and not prone to 
any catastrophic degradation of handling qualities due to 
these effects or others. 
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Figure 2:  Illustration of Adverse, Neutral, and Proverse Translational-into-Rotational Coupling 
 
Fuel Consumption 
The rotational-translational coupling effects influence fuel 
consumption in two ways. First, fuel consumption is driven 
by the design of a control law compensator that might 
minimize the coupling effects (e.g., RCAH vs. feed-forward 
controller). Second, the rotational coupling (i.e., handling 
qualities) affects the number of translational inputs required 
for the task [20,21]. Larger attitude deadbands for an RCAH 
controller uses less fuel in compensating for rotational-
translational coupling due to translational inputs than 
smaller deadbands. Analogously, the feedforward 
compensator uses more fuel than a typical RCAH controller. 
However, testing showed that during the task, a properly 
designed feedforward controller used less overall fuel than 
an RCAH design because the pilots used fewer translational 
inputs. The predictability of the system and fewer deadband 
firings resulted in overall less fuel expenditure during the 
task [20]. The net result is that better handling qualities 
corresponded to less propellant consumed. 
Display / Aiding Information 
Various display information methods have been attempted 
to compensate for rotational-translational coupling effects 
[20, 21]. Each have varying degrees of success, none major 
and few with consensus of opinion. The most successful of 
these are the deadband indicators – explicitly showing the 
crew the attitude (and rate) at which a deadband in the 
RCAH controller will fire. Translational rate and 
positioning information with respect to the docking Local 
Vertical Local Horizontal (LVLH) axis was also put to 
excellent use. 
But by far, the preeminent display factor influencing these 
evaluations was the docking camera. Evaluations were not 
flown without the docking camera or with boresight or 
parallax issues, but its critical role in the task/mission was 
apparent. The importance of visual aids for docking 
alignment was established in Gemini/Apollo and design 
provisions were made accordingly [9]. The appropriate 
provisions must be ensured in future spacecraft designs 
either by redundancy in the event of a camera failure or 
alternate positioning aids. 
Task Influences 
Apollo and Gemini docking used much higher closure rates 
than the 0.1 ft/sec standard used by Shuttle (nearly an order 
of magnitude). The reasons are many (different docking 
mechanisms and an almost order of magnitude mass 
difference between Gemini/Apollo and Shuttle), but they 
may not hold true in future operations. 
An evaluation of docking closure rate was conducted using 
0.5 ft/sec closure starting at 50 ft from the docking port with 
an initial 2.5 ft offset from the approach corridor [17]. The 
handling qualities effects are illustrated in Figure 3, using a 
“bubble” chart where each HQR is shown and the size of the 
HQR bubble is proportional to the number of ratings at that 
level. 
With a RCAH holding the docking attitude, the higher 
closure rate task produced generally worse HQRs, but not 
dramatically so. Adequate, if not desired docking 
performance was the norm. However, with 6 DOF control 
and rotational due to translational coupling, ratings of 10 
were generally given. At these higher closure rates, “you 
don’t have enough time to be messing around with all these 
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kind of control inputs that you have to do.” Potentially 
catastrophic consequences could result. 
Rotating Targets 
Current low earth operations to the ISS provide stationary or 
quasi-stationary docking targets. Future docking 
requirements may involve rotating targets, especially in case 
of attitude control failures resulting in an uncooperative 
target vehicle. 
Evaluations of docking attempts with rotating targets 
showed this was possible, but the pilot workload was not 
tolerable [21].  
The pilots demonstrated amazing adaptability to the various 
configuration effects and targets but an overwhelming need 
for reconfigurable digital autopilot control (DAP) was 
voiced. The ability to tailor the DAP gains and modes, in 
terms of pulse size, direct vs. pulse, and segregated, 
selectable modes per axis (rotational and translational), were 
critical to success.  
 
Figure 3: Effect of Tasking Differences on HQRs 
 
4. LUNAR LANDING HQ IMPLICATIONS 
The holistic design (and impact) of handling qualities on a 
spacecraft design is illustrated in the following, using the 
design and results of a piloted simulation of a lunar landing 
vehicle.  
Lunar Lander Handling Qualities Design Implications 
As NASA looked to return to the lunar surface, the design 
issues and lessons-learned of Apollo were closely studied as 
they are still relevant today for practical planetary and lunar 
lander vehicle designs and missions [22-27]. From this 
baseline, additional challenges for the vehicle design were 
levied to improve the scientific return for manned lunar 
missions.  
• Missions were slated toward the scientifically 
interesting lunar polar regions, unlike the equatorial 
landing sites of Apollo.  
• Missions were to be flown “any time.”  
• A lunar habitat and a sustainable infrastructure would 
be developed for an enduring scientific presence.  
These mission objectives created several design constraints 
relevant to the handling qualities, and ultimately, the 
vehicle’s design: 
1) In the polar region, the very low sun angles create 
visually powerful shadow effects that cause the loss of 
natural vision depth cues and impair translational 
velocity and landing zone awareness.  
2) Operations would be independent of the landing zone 
lighting conditions (unlike Apollo, where “optimal” 
lighting was designed by the timing of the launch). 
3) Habitat build-up constrains the landing approach 
procedures and dictates much higher landing accuracy 
than Apollo.  
These design constraints further define the operational task 
or mission task elements which the vehicle’s handling 
qualities and consequently, the spacecraft design: 
a) Landing precision is dictated by the proximity to a 
habitat build-up; no “overflight” is permitted. 
b) Minimum fuel consumption is preeminent. 
c) Natural vision may or may not be useful to the 
pilot/crew. 
d) Approaches to the landing site will need an out-of-
plane maneuver (such as a “dogleg” approach) to 
minimize collateral damage to the habitat from the 
descent module in the event of a landing abort 
(with subsequent staging of any descent hardware). 
The lack of natural vision references for the pilot/crew is 
both a blessing and a curse. During Apollo, the constraints 
placed by the design of the Lunar Module (LM) window for 
crew visibility and landing trajectory were “a major 
problem” [22]. Apollo used a “pitch-up” maneuver in the 
final approach descent and landing phase and a judiciously 
designed window configuration to enable the flight crew to 
have approximately two minutes of viewing of the planned 
landing site. The pitch-up sacrificed fuel usage by rotating 
the vehicle to a near vertical orientation, so the crew could 
see and verify the integrity of the landing site (e.g., free of 
rocks and debris, terrain slope within design allowances) 
through a window that provided almost 70 deg nose-low 
visibility. Optimal visibility conditions were provided by 
operational procedures and constraints, including launch 
times, dates, and landing locations.  
Automated landing of Apollo was possible, but all landings 
were manually flown with the crew taking over control 
between 550 and 240 ft above the touchdown zone elevation 
[26]. After Apollo 11, each crew performed at least 1, and 
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as many as 18, landing zone re-designations during the 
pitch-up phase [27].  
Technologies developed since Apollo offer potential ways 
to break some of the aforementioned Apollo operational and 
design constraints as well as meeting the new Exploration 
challenges. For instance, Synthetic and Enhanced Vision 
(SV/EV) technologies, conceived and developed in the 
aviation domain, may eliminate the challenges imposed by a 
natural vision constraint and thus, enable additional benefits 
for safer, more efficient operations [28]. These technologies 
are being used, in whole or in part, under the Autonomous 
Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) [29].  
SV/EV technologies offer the possibility that fuel-expensive 
Apollo-like pitch-up maneuvers would be unnecessary using 
“equivalent vision” instead [30]. SV/EV technologies can 
provide equivalent visual information sufficient for the crew 
to obviate the impact of landing zone obscurants and be 
independent of window sizes and placements, visual 
illusions, or lighting/depth perception conditions. 
These challenges exist within the broader context of manual 
control, handling qualities, and the engineering design trade-
space for a Lunar Landing vehicle.  
Lunar Lander Handling Qualities Design  
A piloted simulation study investigated the handling 
qualities of a lunar landing vehicle and the influence of 
critical design issues with operational employment 
consequences. The focus was on visual cueing and control 
effector sizing during manual control of the approach and 
landing of a lunar landing vehicle, enabling a quantification 
of the trade-space for the vehicle design and operational 
deployment. Automatic control modes of the vehicle were a 
recognized design feature of future lunar lander vehicles; 
the implications of which are discussed in Section 5. 
Control Laws—RCAH control laws with a phase-plane 
controller were evaluated. Other control law methods were 
rejected for evaluation: 
 Translational control using the RCS, while precision 
control is offered, will typically be underpowered and 
thus, not conducive to minimum fuel/minimum fuel 
objectives [31].  
 Thrust vectoring control (TVC) of the descent engine 
[32] offers excellent control power, but is critically 
flawed due to potential failure modes. Apollo 
evaluated this concept but rejected it, limiting TVC 
rates to provide trim control to avoid catastrophic TVC 
actuator failure consequences [33].  
 More sophisticated control methods such as 
translational rate command-position hold functions 
were dismissed because, while excellent performance 
has been demonstrated in rotorcraft applications and 
elsewhere [34], they lack in simplicity of design. They 
also can suffer from the human-centered design 
principles since, with only one-sixth gravity, this 
method requires very large attitudes for rate or 
position hold functions. Elaborate display and alerting 
functions would be needed for the crew to 
appropriately monitor normal operations and provide 
timely intervention and recovery in event of failures.  
Control Power—“Satisfactory” and “Acceptable for 
Emergency Operations Only” handling characteristics 
guidelines for rotational control effectiveness, using the 
Cooper rating scale [35] emerged from the Apollo data [36]. 
The criterion, for a RCAH control law, boils down to: 1) the 
maximum rotational acceleration authority; and, 2) the 
chosen maximum rate command provided to the pilot.  
The maximum rotational acceleration authority is 
approximately the RCS jet size, multiplied by the number of 
RCS jets and their moment arm and divided by the 
rotational inertia. Part of the HQ design trade-space can be 
illustrated using the Apollo LM experience. For Apollo, the 
criteria were met when four RCS jets were used. Nominally, 
however, only two jets were fired to conserve RCS 
propellant but for circumstances that dictate higher 
rotational control (e.g., excessive rate error in the RCAH 
control law), four jets were available [13]. Apollo also 
placed the RCS jets on the ascent module. This placement 
increased the moment arm (increased rotational 
effectiveness). It also increased the LM ascent mass. The 
RCS jets were also used for on-orbit attitude control. This 
obviated the need to have two sets of RCS jets (one for 
descent; one for ascent and on-orbit) but the LM RCS jets, 
sized for the landing mission, were found to be too large for 
on-orbit operations, causing proximity and operations HQ 
issues [37].  
The present-day concern is that the rotational control 
effectiveness required to meet the Apollo guidelines are 
significantly larger than what current designs may 
practically provide. Validation of the guidelines is needed 
and possible alternative methods to satisfy handling 
qualities should be explored. 
NASA Ames has recently conducted two Vertical Motion 
Simulator tests evaluating the validity of these rotational 
control effectiveness criteria from Apollo [31,38]. 
Evaluations were conducted using a 15 degree (deg) 
glideslope trajectory to a pitch-up for vertical landing, 
mirroring the initial Apollo lunar landings. The term 
“glideslope” is used throughout as an analogy to the 
aeronautics domain, where a constant approach angle to 
landing is flown. In this application, a constant angle 
approach is only approximate; the trajectory curves from the 
initial approach angle to smoothly transition to a hover point 
above the landing zone, transitioning to a vertical descent to 
landing.  
Testing was conducted with and without explicit pitch, roll, 
and rate-of-descent guidance commands shown on head-
down displays. Testing was planned to vary the evaluation 
task, flying with and without a 250 ft lateral offset/dog-leg 
approach from the initial trajectory to the vertical landing. 
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However, pre-test work showed that, without explicit 
guidance, the evaluation pilots could not reliably complete 
the task with a lateral offset. For the no-guidance test cases, 
only a straight-in task was flown.  
For the lateral offset task with guidance, the Apollo design 
guidelines were roughly supported. But for a straight-in 
task, without an offset, the degradation of handling qualities 
with decreasing control authority was not strongly 
supported.  
In the second test, the characteristics of the Lander Vehicle 
were changed, but the major elements of the test were 
replicated.  
A summary plot of the data against the guidelines is shown 
in Figure 4. The plot uses median HQRs for the twelve 
evaluation pilots. The trends generally follow the first 
simulation test results. At the highest levels of control 
power tested, median Level 1 pilot ratings were generally 
given. The individual rating data, however, exhibits 
substantial scatter. Some Level 3 or nearly Level 3 ratings 
were given for those configurations with median Level 1 
ratings. The rating scatter warrants concerns since this 
suggests the possibility of lurking cliff-like HQ 
characteristics where Level 1 handling characteristics can 
quickly degrade due to the presence of system 
nonlinearities, latency, or handling characteristics 
inappropriately sensitive to pilot techniques [38].  
 
Figure 4:  HQR Level Data [38] vs. Guidelines [13] 
Test Description 
A pilot-in-the-loop simulation was conducted to explore the 
control and display interactions on the handling qualities of 
a lunar lander vehicle.  
This work built upon the previous work [31,38] but 
explored the control and display interactions in a lunar 
lander design. 
First, the previous work evaluated only shallow 15 deg 
glideslope trajectories to the landing zone. This trajectory 
angle was flown for the initial Apollo LM missions, but the 
later so-called “J” missions used trajectories approaching 25 
deg glideslope. Future vehicles may find it advantageous to 
use higher glideslope angles to landing [39]. Trajectory 
design is part of the trade-off in fuel consumption and 
natural vision viewing of the landing site.   
Second, the previous work provided for and allowed the use 
of direct translation control by the pilot using a translational 
hand controller. Although the control authority was 
minimal, it was permitted and introduced a degree-of-
freedom which differed from Apollo. In Apollo, only 
rotational attitude control to effect translational positioning 
was used because of the significant amount of rotational 
coupling introduced by translational control inputs. The 
RCS jets were located on the Ascent Module for maximum 
rotational control authority. Evaluations were conducted 
without allowing direct translational control for comparison.  
Finally, the critical influence of visual cues was considered. 
As the trajectory approach angle is changed, the pitch 
attitude will vary; thus, affecting the amount of time that the 
crew can use for natural vision viewing of the landing site. 
The previous work showed that manual flight to an offset 
landing zone was not possible. One might consider that this 
result was because the out-the-window simulated visual 
cues were insufficient to support the task (as discussed 
later). On the other hand, the visual cues might have been 
sufficient but the control characteristics were deficient. In 
any event, the influence of natural vision and the potential 
of “equivalent vision” technologies warranted exploration. 
Equivalent vision may represent a new tool in the manned 
planetary exploration designers’ “tool-bag.”  
These experimental objectives were evaluated in the context 
of variations in the control authority of a lunar landing 
vehicle which uses a RCAH control law, analogous to the 
guidelines developed under Apollo.  
Simulated Spacecraft 
A simulation model (Figure 5) was built based on evolving 
lunar lander designs [32].  
The simulation model was built using object-oriented 
programming techniques within the Langley Standard 
Realtime Simulation in C++ (LaSRS++) software 
framework [40]. A generic-spacecraft simulation within this 
framework served as a test bed for modeling spacecraft 
dynamics, propulsion, control systems, guidance, and 
displays. 
The vehicle model was composed of interconnected stages, 
simulated using a parent/child relationship. The ascent stage 
was modeled as the parent with the descent stage as a child. 
The descent stage contained separate mass models for the 
main engine fuel, RCS fuel, and the airlock. Force models 
were provided for the main engine, each of the sixteen RCS 
engines, and the four landing gear models. For simplicity, 
the throttle-able, thrust output of the main engine force 
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model was placed close to the lateral and horizontal axes of 
the stacked center-of-mass. Active gimbaling of the main 
engine was provided to trim the thrust vector through the 
CM. All forces and moments were applied to the stacked 
vehicle’s center of mass. Fuel slosh was not modeled.  
The pilot, as defined by the design eye point reference 
(DERP), was located 28.1 ft above the extended landing 
gear position. The center of mass at the initial starting 
condition was 6.6 ft below the DERP. The four RCS jets 
were placed in a ring around the descent stage using an 
orthogonal quadrant of four individual thrusters for attitude 
control. The RCS thruster size was experimentally varied. 
The RCS jets were located at a 14.8 ft radial from the 
centerline of the vehicle (i.e., the moment arm), 
approximately 7.7 ft below the DERP. 
 
Figure 5:  Simulated Lunar Landing Vehicle 
Control Laws 
The guidance and control laws were implemented in 
Simulink/Stateflow and autocoded for use in the real-time 
simulation shell (LaSRS++).  
RCAH control laws (in body-axis pitch, roll and yaw axes) 
included an RCS mixer which determined the jets to fire to 
provide the commanded accelerations. The rate deadband 
for the phase plane controller was 2.0 deg/sec and the 
attitude deadband was 0.5 deg.  
Sixteen RCS jets were arranged in four quads, with four 
orthogonal jets in each quad (Figure 6). A simplified 
thruster mapping dedicated RCS thruster firings to each 
moment command. Because of the simplified logic, when 
simultaneous pitch and roll inputs are commanded, the 
control authorities are effectively halved in each axis. 
Various jet combination mappings were considered but 
rejected for simplicity of design.  
 
Figure 6: Descent Module (top view) RCS Locations –  
 Quads 1-4 and Jets 1-4 on each Quad 
The RCS jet size was experimentally varied to create 
various angular acceleration control authorities. 
An autothrottle was mechanized to hold a pilot-commanded 
vertical descent rate. Translational Hand Controller (THC) 
pilot inputs commanded discrete one ft/s increments to the 
commanded vertical descent rate. Proportional and integral 
control modulated the descent engine thrust. The engine 
throttle response rate was not limited. 
Simulator 
The experiment was conducted in the fixed-base Lunar 
Flight Deck simulation facility at NASA Langley Research 
Center (LaRC). The Lunar Flight Deck used multiple 
projectors and a dome screen to provide a 135o horizontal 
(H) x 67.5o vertical (V) field-of-view. The screen was 
located 10.6 ft from the DERP. The dome and projection 
system were biased to provide 22.5o up and 45.0o down 
viewing angle from the DERP. The multiple image 
generators and projectors are warped and blended to provide 
uniform and seamless ~30 pixels per deg resolution across 
the field-of-view, referenced to the DERP.  
A lunar polar landing site was preferred for the evaluations 
but terrain data of reasonable resolution was not available. 
Instead, the Apollo 15 landing site was utilized because of 
the availability of higher resolution data and the interesting 
terrain features it provided. The out-the-window (OTW) 
lunar database was created using lunar topology and 
imagery data collected by the Clementine project [41]. 
Medium resolution data was used in the general area of the 
Apollo 15 landing site, approximately 500 meters per 
elevation post, draped with 125 meter per pixel imagery. 
Higher resolution data was inset in the immediate vicinity of 
the Apollo 15 landing site (15 meters per elevation post-
spacing, draped with 4 meter per pixel imagery). 
In the landing area, the resolution of the OTW database was 
good, but not to levels approaching the real-world. The 
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OTW presentation was augmented with boulder and habitat 
models to increase the visual density.  
The evaluation pilot (EP) conducted the task in a standing 
position, analogous to the Apollo Lunar Module design. The 
crew station is shown in Figure 7. A window (20 inch H x 
14 inch V) approximated the field-of-view anticipated for a 
Lunar Lander vehicle. Two head-down (13.25 inch H x 10.5 
inch V) displays, using 1280 x 1024 pixel resolution, 
provided primary flight, navigation, and systems awareness 
for the EP.  
 
Figure 7: Lunar Landing Flight Deck 
Control Inceptors 
The EPs used an Apollo-vintage Rotational Hand Controller 
(RHC) and Translational Hand Controller (THC). The 
controllers were mechanical and their characteristics fixed.  
The right-hand RHC provided 3-axis rotational control 
commands, using a base pivot for roll, palm-pivot for pitch, 
and twist-pivot for yaw. The mechanical characteristics of 
the RHC provided +/- 27.5 deg total deflection in roll using 
a maximum force of 3.5 lb applied at the roll pivot point 
(five inches above the roll rotation point, approximately 
mid-grip). There was approximately 0.5 lb of hysteresis 
with 1.0 lb of break-out force. 
The mechanical characteristics of the RHC provided +/-15.0 
deg total deflection in pitch with maximum force of 3.5 lb 
applied at the pitch pivot point (~2.625 inches above the 
rotation point, near top of grip). There was approximately 
0.75 lb of hysteresis with 0.25 lb of break-out force. 
A deadband function using 15% of the full-throw 
deflections was applied to the pitch and roll signal and 
scaled to create a +/-1.0 command signal. The scaled roll 
and pitch inputs () were parabolically shaped to create the 
pitch rate and roll rate commands (qs and ps, respectively) 
using the equation ݌௦, ݍ௦ ൌ ߜ כ ሺ1 െ ݄ܵܽ݌݁ሻ ൅  ݄ܵܽ݌݁ כ ߜ כ|ߜ| where the term ݄ܵܽ݌݁ was equal to 0.90. The shaping 
function appropriately tailored the response sensitivity for 
the sidestick controller.  
The resulting parabolic shaping mimics that used in Apollo. 
The shaped roll and pitch inputs were multiplied by 12 
deg/sec to create the pilot commanded roll and pitch RCAH 
control law inputs. 
The left-hand THC was provisioned for 3-axis translational 
control commands but only up/down vertical commands 
were active. Up/down pilot inputs of the THC were 
converted into vertical descent rate command increments. 
Each discrete THC input would increment the value of the 
commanded descent rate by one ft/sec.  
Aural call-outs of the altitude above the terrain (extended 
gear height) were provided during the landing phase in 10 ft 
increments starting at 150 ft and continuing until 
touchdown.  
Head-Down Displays 
The two-color head-down displays showed four primary 
display formats: a) Attitude Direction Indicator (ADI); b) 
Navigation Display (ND); c) Vertical Situation Display 
(VSD); and Auxiliary Display.  
The ADI (Fig. 8) served as the primary flight display. The 
ADI showed lunar attitude reference using a roll/pitch/yaw 
“eight-ball.” The ADI included digital readouts of ground 
speed (in knots), altitude (in ft, height above the landing 
zone), radar altitude (in ft, height terrain below extended 
gear position), and vertical descent rate (in ft/sec). On the 
vertical descent rate display, a magenta circle indicated the 
guidance-commanded descent rate. Yellow pitch, roll, and 
yaw “flight director” needles were also displayed depending 
upon the experimental condition. The needles provided “fly-
to” pitch, roll, and yaw attitude guidance to fly the 
trajectories to landing. Additional, less-critical status mode 
information was shown in periphery. 
 
 
Figure 8: ADI 
The ND provided a top-down, “God’s eye” view of ownship 
position and the planned landing zone (Fig. 9). The ND was 
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always drawn with ownship in the center, heading up, and 
the range scale automatically adjusted to keep the landing 
zone on the display. Synthetic imagery was used in the 
background. The ND transitioned from a flight-mode to a 
hover mode once the ground speed was less than 38 knots.  
• In the flight-mode, the landing zone was depicted by a 
magenta-colored hexagon symbol.  
• In hover mode, the landing zone was depicted by two 
octagons. The octagons were sized to accurately 
represent the size of the desired and adequate landing 
performance standards. In addition, digital display of 
the body-axis forward and side velocities were 
presented with a graphical representation of this same 
information, indicated by a white line and cross symbol 
emanating from the ownship position.  
• In the hover mode, a hover cue symbol was also 
displayed, depending upon the experimental condition.  
 
Figure 9: ND – Hover Mode 
The VSD provided a profile/side view of ownship position 
and the landing zone. The auxiliary display provided a 
simulated forward looking infrared (FLIR) image of the 
outside world from 45o to 75o  nose-low from the DERP. 
This camera view supplemented the EP’s visibility below 
the 45o cut-off of the simulated window.  
Command Guidance 
The ADI flight director bars were driven to provide explicit 
pitch, roll, and yaw command guidance to fly an approach 
path, transition to a vertical descent, and conduct a vertical 
landing. The guidance was defined in a series of phases, 
depending on distance from the landing site. 
The command guidance used three phases: 
• The approach phase used a constant deceleration profile 
which allowed for a near-constant pitch (deck) angle, 
flight path angle and thrust-to-weight ratio. The 
guidance provided corrections to pitch angle, roll angle 
and thrust level of the vehicle to correct for any 
deviations from the desired trajectory. 
• The guidance mode switched to a hover phase at a 
fixed-time prior to the end of the straight-line approach 
phase trajectory. In this phase, pitch angle, roll angle 
and thrust level commands would bring the vehicle to a 
hover over the landing target at ~100 ft height. 
• The final descent phase was initiated once the pitch, 
roll, velocity and horizontal position of the vehicle was 
within parameters over the designated landing area. 
Hover Cue Guidance 
An alternative form of flight guidance was mechanized for 
experimental variation as a possibly simpler means of 
enabling lunar landings and tailored toward manual control 
considerations. In this case, the guidance was in the form of 
a hover cue. The hover cue is part of an integrated 
symbology set, including the ownship position symbol, 
velocity vector, and conformal landing zone designator.  
The hover cue was mechanized as a “fly-to” symbology 
element where the positioning and dynamics of the cue 
provided manual control guidance for the pilot to smoothly 
approach a desired landing position and achieve zero 
horizontal velocity (i.e., a hover condition). The pilot’s task 
is to use the pitch and roll inceptor to place the hover cue 
and hold its position over the desired landing site (i.e., “put 
the ball in the octagon”).  
The hover cue closely follows from rotorcraft work [42] 
with adaptation for a non-atmospheric flying vehicle as 
described in the following. The cue is, in essence, a flight 
director. The motivation for this “guidance” element is that, 
if successful, a hover cue would be ideally suited for a 
manually-controlled re-designated landing task, especially 
when coupled with a head-up display or head-worn display 
projecting this cue against conformal imagery or the actual 
lunar terrain. In these cases, the hover cue would be 
controlled by the pilot, superimposed on a pilot-selected 
landing site; the hover cue “guidance” provides a simple 
means of achieving a hover over a pilot-designated point.   
For this work, the conformal landing zone designator was 
the desired touchdown/landing position. The velocity vector 
provided a graphical depiction of the horizontal velocity 
(digital readouts of forward and side velocity were also 
provided). The hover cue was shown on either the ND or on 
a Head-Worn Display (HWD) [41].  
Ownship position was fixed in the center of the display and 
automatic range settings were applied to keep the landing 
zone at a reasonable range scale on the displays.  
Earth-bound vehicle applications of the hover cue guidance 
have been implemented, but to the authors’ knowledge, this 
was the first lunar lander application.  
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In the design of the hover cue dynamics, it has been 
assumed that three coincident real-axis roots between 
aircraft velocity and stick position produced desirable 
dynamics [42]. The positioning of the hover cue followed 
this assumption where the pilot applies compensation to 
control the hover cue in a position (x) closure task (Figure 
10). 
With this assumption, the longitudinal position of the hover 
cue, Ax is derived. The lateral position, Ay, was directly 
analogous, but not shown here. 
The longitudinal position was computed from: 
ܣ௫ ൌ ܭ௫ሶ
ሺݏ ൅ ߱଴ሻଷ
߱଴ଷ ݔሶ  
where  ܭ௫ሶ  is a display gain, deg/ft/sec. 
 ߱௢ is a bandwidth parameter, rad/sec 
 ݔሶ  is the body-axis forward velocity, ft/sec 
 
This equation is algebraically expanded to yield: 
ܣ௫ ൌ ܭ௫ሶ߱଴ଷ ݔሷݏ
ଶ ൅  3 ܭ௫ሶ߱଴ଶ ݔሷݏ ൅ 3
ܭ௫ሶ
߱௢ ݔሷ ൅ ܭ௫ሶݔሶ  
The term, ܭ௫ሶݔሶ  positions the reference for the hover cue at 
the same location as the velocity vector, where ܭ௫ሶ ൌ ܭݑ. in 
Figure 10. For our lunar lander application, a small angle 
approximation was invoked so ݔሷ ൌ  െܶ ݉ൗ ߠ  where T is the 
vehicle thrust, m is the mass, and  is the pitch attitude. 
Thrust and mass were real-time variables in the guidance 
calculation. It then follows that ݔሷݏ ൌ  െܶ ݉ൗ ݍ , where q is 
the vehicle pitch rate.  
The first term, ݔሷݏଶ was derived using the RHC stick 
position (). The vehicle control laws were RCAH-type, but 
manifested as a discrete, phase-plane controller without 
aerodynamic damping effects. Using a loose approximation 
for an RCAH control law, ݍ ߜൗ ൌ  ܭோ஼஺ு ሺ߬ݏ ൅ 1ሻൗ , the ݔሷݏଶ 
term was approximated by ൫െܶ ݉ൗ ൯ܭோ஼஺ு ቀݏ ሺ߬ݏ ൅ 1ሻൗ ቁ ߜ. 
By this assumption, the hover cue effectively uses a 
washed-out RHC input () where the time constant, , is 
dependent upon the responsiveness of the pitch rate 
controller. The time constant () was selected to 
approximate the pitch rate response of the phase-plane 
controllers and the gain, KRCAH was equal to the maximum, 
full stick deflection rate command (12 deg/sec). Since the 
angular acceleration was experimentally varied, the selected 
values for  (shown in Table 2) were varied accordingly. 
These  values were defined by the approximate time to 
reach 63% of the spacecraft’s rate response for a full-stick 
input command. 
Table 2 
Values for RCAH Time Constant / Hover Cue 
RCS Jet Size Control Power 
68 lbf 1.1 deg/sec2 7.0 sec 
100 lbf 1.6 deg/sec2 5.0 sec 
180 lbf 2.9 deg/sec2 2.75 sec 
270 lbf 4.3 deg/sec2 1.75 sec 
540 lbf 8.6 deg/sec2 1.0 sec 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Illustration of Hover Symbology 
The sensitivity or scaling of the hover cue critically 
influences its utility and usability. The selections and 
rationale were as follows: 
• The ND range was automatically adjusted to keep the 
landing zone conformally on the screen. The visual 
angle subtended by the ND was approximately 20 deg. 
Therefore, the display unit scaling, Kx, was equal to 20 
deg/NDrange, where NDrange was the automatically set 
range scale in ft. The minimum navigation scale range 
(NDrange) was 200 ft.  
• Pre-test experimentation indicated that a bandwidth 
selection (0) of 0.5 rad/sec was a reasonable selection 
considering the piloting demands for this task and the 
vehicle dynamics being considered as “representative” 
for a lunar landing mission.  
• As detailed in [42], the relationship between the 
velocity scaling and the display scaling (in addition of 
the bandwidth parameter) effectively specify the speed 
Navigation Display
Hover Cue
Velocity Vector
Ownship Position
Conformal Landing
Zone Designator
(Kx*xc, Ky*yc)
(Ax, Ay)
(Ku*u, Kv*v)
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of the position loop closure response. For the selected 
bandwidth, root locus calculations for the assumed loop 
closure task dictated that a well-damped loop gain, 
ܭ௫ ܭ௫ሶൗ  should be 0.065 (which provided a damping 
ratio of 0.85). The velocity display scaling ܭ௫ሶ  falls out.  
Smoothing was applied to the input signals to temper 
(somewhat) the jerkiness of the symbol movement due to 
the discrete nature of the RCS firings. First-order, low-pass 
filters were applied to the attitudes, and attitude rates with 
time constants of 0.2 sec and 0.1 sec, respectively. First-
order, low-pass filters were also applied to the RHC inputs 
to eliminate high-frequency noise in the signal, using a time 
constant of 0.2 sec. 
Experiment  
The primary experimental goal was to evaluate the 
interaction of controls and displays on the handling qualities 
of a lunar landing vehicle. Variations in approach trajectory 
were experimentally tested because they interact with fuel 
and natural vision viewability of the landing zone.  
A full-factorial matrix was developed, consisting of 3 
approach trajectories (15, 30, and 45 deg), five control 
powers (Table 2), and 2 guidance conditions (head-down 
guidance on ADI and hover cue flight director). The hover 
cue was also evaluated as part of a “virtual HUD” concept 
using a HWD [41]. Due to time limitations, a subset of this 
matrix was identified as the primary matrix which the 
majority of EPs were to evaluate; the remainder of the 
matrix was tested as time permitted.  
Each run of the experiment began 1000 ft above the landing 
target. Three different approach angles were experimentally 
varied: 15 deg; 30 deg; and 45 deg. The initial distance up-
range from the landing site was varied accordingly. The 
initial velocity varied as well to provide approximately the 
same duration of the approach from start to finish. 
Evaluation Tasks—Each run started at approximately 1000 
ft above the landing zone elevation flying on auto-pilot 
following the constant deceleration trajectory profile, to a 
designated landing zone directly forward of the vehicle’s 
track. This period of auto-flight provided two benefits: 1) it 
allowed the pilots to prepare for the next phase (manual 
flight); and, 2) it was representative of an operational 
profile, where the auto-flight system will fly to a certain 
altitude, but the crew will take-over manually for the final 
landing. This procedure was done for all Apollo flights [27] 
and will likely occur for other crewed missions. An 
additional motivation is that this auto-flight period might be 
representative of a re-designation period where the crew 
might be evaluating real-time sensor data and navigation 
systems data to decide if the planned landing zone is safe 
and appropriate or if a landing zone re-designation is 
necessary [29].  
At 500 ft above the touchdown zone, the auto-flight system 
was disconnected automatically. An aural auto-flight 
disconnect alert was triggered. Concurrently, the landing 
zone was automatically re-designated left or right by 250 ft 
from its original position. The EP was then tasked to fly and 
land on this re-designated landing zone using either the 
hover cue (hereafter referred to as the “aided” condition) or 
explicit pitch/roll guidance (hereafter referred to as the 
“guided” condition).  
The 250 ft offset landing zone mimicked the scenario where 
a re-designated landing zone had been executed and the 
pilot must now fly to the new landing area. The scenario 
was also analogous to the offset landing task from the 
aeronautics domain. The 250 ft offset was chosen to match 
previously conducted work [31,38].  
The pilot’s task was to control the vehicle’s trajectory, fly to 
a hover transition, and execute a vertical descent to land to 
achieve prescribed landing performance standards using 
either explicit guidance or a hover cue in addition to 
available out-the-window visual cues.  
In both conditions, the desired descent rate to fly to the 
hover transition point, developed from the guidance concept 
described above, was provided. Vertical descent rate was 
controlled by discrete THC inputs.  
The desired and adequate performance standards are shown 
in Table 3. These parameters only applied to the landing. At 
the end of each run, a “scorecard” was shown on their head-
down display given them their performance against each of 
these standards. 
Table 3 
Task Performance Standards 
Parameter Desired 
Performance 
Adequate 
Performance 
Range At 
Touchdown 
< 15 ft < 25 ft 
Sink Rate  < 5 ft/sec < 7 ft/sec 
Forward/Side 
Velocity 
< 2 ft/sec < 4 ft/sec 
Pitch/Roll Angle  < ± 3 deg < ± 6 deg 
Pitch/Roll Rate  < ± 3 deg/sec < ± 6 deg/sec 
Yaw Rate  < ± 1.0 deg/sec < ± 1.5 ft/sec 
 
No performance standards were enforced during the 
approach phase with the exception of a vertical descent rate 
performance standard. The pilots were instructed to follow 
the vertical descent rate guidance, but the pilots were told 
that if they stopped their descent, their task performance 
could be no better than “adequate”. If they climbed, their 
task performance was considered “not adequate.” Fuel 
usage (propellant consumption) was not a parameter in the 
task performance standards, because this test was designed 
as an evaluation of handling qualities. Fuel consumption, of 
course, is critical for a spacecraft design and it is analyzed 
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post-test because of its criticality. To use it as a Cooper-
Harper task performance standard would skew the piloting 
technique to minimize propellant usage. The vertical 
descent rate requirement was the one concession to 
criticality of fuel. The descent rate criteria essentially 
required that the vehicle was continually descending toward 
the landing zone. If a hover condition, or worse yet, a climb 
is performed, fuel consumption will be unreasonable given 
that this type of vehicle will undoubtedly be “fuel-critical.” 
While a hover or climb may be technically feasible, it would 
have to be a last-ditch maneuver. A hover or climb 
essentially buys the crew more time to control the vehicle. 
This is a sign of poor handling qualities since the landing 
site is assumed to be clear of obstructions. Therefore, task 
performance penalties were enforced.  
Other Elements 
Experiment Protocol—Prior to the start of data collection, 
the EPs were briefed on the purpose of the experiment and 
flew numerous practice trials following the experiment 
protocol with a variety of experimental configurations until 
they reached an acceptable, consistent level of proficiency 
in the task. Upon the start of formal data collection, for each 
configuration, the EPs first flew one approach and landing 
for practice/familiarity, followed by a minimum of two runs 
for “data.” The EP had the option for a third run if they felt 
that the two runs exhibited very different characteristics that 
potentially hampered their handling qualities assessment.  
Following the tasks, the EPs assigned a HQR using the 
Cooper-Harper rating scale. Pilot comments were then 
given, generally prompted via a comment card. Finally, 
NASA Task Load Index (TLX) workload ratings were 
given.  
Evaluation Pilots—Eight EPs flew this experiment, 
completed in 2009. All subjects had graduated as pilots 
from the U.S. Air Force or Navy Test Pilot Schools and 
were experienced in aircraft handling qualities evaluations. 
Needless to say, none were experienced in lunar landings. 
Some had considerable experience in rotary wing vehicles. 
Two of the EPs were current or former Astronauts.  
Holistic Impact of Design/HQs 
The influence – and interdependency – of manual control 
handling qualities and the vehicle design considerations are 
described using the handling qualities results.  
Effect of Glideslope Variations – Piloting Task Influence —
By the nature of the constant deceleration approach profile, 
the approach phase was essentially a pitch attitude 
maintenance task. Very few pitch inputs were required to 
maintain the approach path once manual control was 
required. So the initial task was primarily a roll task to start 
tracking toward the new landing zone. The pilot had from 
the 500 ft altitude point to the hover transition to correct for 
the lateral offset. For all glideslopes flown, the 250 ft offset 
approach (simulating a landing point redesignation) was a 
reasonable piloting task. The flight crew had sufficient time 
to effect a landing. 
At the hover transition point, the constant deceleration 
profile could create a significant pitch task. This task was 
most demanding for the lower glideslope angles. For 
instance, the 15 deg glideslope approach used a fairly large 
pitch attitude (~20o pitch attitude) that had to be removed 
very quickly and precisely as the hover transition point was 
reached. If not, the vehicle would undershoot or overshoot 
the landing zone and then, low altitude re-corrections were 
necessary. In contrast, the 45 deg glideslope approach 
involved very little pitch attitude change. The ground speed 
approaching the landing zone was considerably less. As 
such, the hover transition was neither as large nor did it 
require as high a degree of precision. The 45 deg approach 
task was more of a lateral tracking task, whose duration 
consists of the entire approach. The 15 deg approach task 
was much more demanding, involving both the lateral offset 
and the abrupt pitch-over near the hover transition point.  
These observations were quantified by the HQRs as shown 
in Figure 11. The pilot rating data is plotted for the highest 
control power condition (8.6 deg/s2) as the task and 
guidance method was varied. For the shallow 15 deg 
glideslope, some Level 1 and some Level 3 ratings were 
given. These significant rating discrepancies reflect subtle 
timing and piloting differences in transitioning to the hover 
phase can create significant performance differences. 
Conversely, predominately Level 1 ratings were given in the 
45 deg glideslope, reflecting an easier piloting. 
Apollo used more of a constant jerk profile (first derivative 
of acceleration) [43] with a tailored pitch-up prior to the 
hover transition. Apollo experience showed that a constant 
deceleration profile was not preferred because of the abrupt 
pitch change and the need for a natural vision viewing 
opportunity. These data show that a constant deceleration 
profile is do-able, especially for higher glideslopes.  
 
Figure 11: HQRs of Glideslope and Guidance Variation 
(8.6 deg/s2 control power) 
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Guidance Method—Two concepts for guidance were tested, 
Guided (using ADI needles) vs. Aided (using a hover cue on 
the navigation display).  
The data generally showed that explicit attitude guidance 
was good in that it provide simple and straight-forward 
command information to enable the transition from the 
approach to a hover over the landing area. The command 
information provided guidance as to when and what 
magnitude of pitch and roll attitude changes were required 
to establish a hover over the landing zone. The display was 
unambiguous and clear and all critical flight information 
(attitude, guidance, speeds, and descent rate information) 
was in close visual proximity. Especially for low control 
power configurations, vehicle attitude was critical “lead” 
information required to keep the vehicle under control and 
to anticipate the size and timing of control inputs to get into 
the hover position.  
Unfortunately, the pitch attitude change, especially for the 
15 deg approaches near the hover transition point, required 
close attention by the EP. It also required precision on the 
part of the EP to track the attitude to achieve desired 
performance. If neither of these conditions were met, the 
vehicle could significantly overshoot or undershoot 
generating low altitude corrections and workload on the part 
of the pilot to use the guidance and the ND to re-correct to 
the landing zone.  
This control behavior is most apparent in the HQR data for 
the lowest control power test (1.1 deg/s2) as shown in Figure 
12. Clear Level 3 handling qualities were indicated for 15 
deg glideslope landing tasks using ADI guidance. As the 
task got easier, the impact was not as severe (15 to 45 deg 
glideslope).  
Figure 12: HQRs of Glideslope and Guidance Variation 
(1.1 deg/s2 control power) 
In general, the EPs preferred the aided condition, using the 
hover cue. The cue took some training (for those that didn’t 
have experience with it), but after training, the cue provided 
some captures of the landing zone. 
The pilot rating and comment data also indicated areas 
where the hover cue needs to be improved as well. The 
discrete nature of the control law induced some substantial 
“jumpiness” in the position of the symbol. Throttle changes 
caused by descent rate control inputs and RCS deadband 
firings were most problematic. Pilots often learned to 
“filter” this out, but they desired more predictable response 
behavior. Also, pilots could get behind the hover cue and 
enter into overcontrol / pilot-induced oscillations for the low 
control power configurations. Vehicle attitude still needed 
to be monitored and this information was not in immediate 
spatial proximity. Methods to ameliorate these 
characteristics were identified but not implemented at this 
time. The aided condition was clearly preferred especially 
since it broke the criticality of timing in successfully 
completing the task. The pilots were more directly in control 
of the hover transition task. 
Head-Down vs. Head-Up Information—The various 
trajectories, in addition to piloting task differences, 
modulated the amount of time that the EPs could use the 
OTW visual cues for the task.  
• The task was flown almost completely head-down. All 
the information required to conduct the task was 
available on the ADI and ND.  
• However, almost all EPs noted the importance out-the-
window visual cues for verification and validation of 
the head-down information. This was not part of the test 
but it should be evaluated in the future. For this test, the 
navigation solution was perfect (no errors) so the ND 
presentation was a completely faithful representation of 
the outside landing zone.  
• The OTW visual cues were insufficient alone for the 
EPs, in general, to control the vehicle – at least to the 
degree that they could in rotary wing aircraft. Higher 
resolution terrain data is required to test and possibly, 
achieve this capability. 
• Head-up information, conformal information was 
desired/preferred. The ability to use the SV/EV 
information and out-the-window was expressed. 
• It was also noted by the astronauts that the landing task 
was going to be a “crew effort.” The out-the-window 
visual cues may not be critical for the commander (i.e., 
pilot-flying), because they will be part of the crew’s 
tasking, where the pilot (i.e., pilot-not-flying), might 
visually designate the landing zone and verify/validate 
the navigation position accuracy. 
The HWD showed significant potential in providing head-
up information while simultaneously showing hover cue 
(aided) guidance [41]. Those with previous familiarity with 
the hover cue (e.g. helicopter pilots) especially showed 
proficiency using this combination. The combination of 
SV/EV information, head-up conformality, and appropriate 
crew tasking suggest that a long pitch-up maneuver for 
natural vision acquisition of the landing zone will not likely 
be required. 
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Effect of Control Power—The data – the pilot ratings and 
comments – clearly indicate that increasing control power 
produces better handling qualities. For the Apollo-type 
configurations (2-jet and 4-jet Apollo RCS with 4.3 and 8.6 
deg/s2 angular acceleration), Level 1 ratings were generally 
given. On some evaluations, some improvement was still 
warranted with the higher control power configurations. 
These poorer ratings were due primarily from display 
deficiencies where improvements were desired.  
Control powers at 1.6 deg/s2 and below are borderline Level 
2-3 or Level 3. Even though desired performance may be 
achievable with these configurations, and some “good” 
Level 2 ratings were given, cliff-like characteristics are 
apparent in these configurations. If the EP fell behind the 
task, made an inadvertent input, or committed a control 
reversal, they could find themselves struggling to get back 
to the landing zone. Pilot ratings of 8, 9, and 10 were 
indicative of these conditions. 
Approach Phase Piloting Task Influence—Stringent 
approach performance criteria were not in effect with the 
exception of the “don’t hover,” “don’t climb” vertical 
descent rate requirement. This procedure may have allowed 
some of the “less than desirable” configurations to achieve 
“reasonable” landing performance which may have biased 
the ratings toward better ratings - the EPs were able to solve 
the conundrum presented by these sluggish configurations.  
The EPs learned that THC control inputs could modulate the 
amount of time available to them to complete the approach 
and landing. If handling issues became apparent, they could 
use the THC to reduce their rate of descent, in essence, 
buying them more time to sort out the horizontal positioning 
control problem. In many cases, desired landing 
performance was achievable, even though the approaches 
were far from optimal. However, these performance 
differences were evident in the fuel usage. Better handling 
configurations used less fuel. 
More work is needed in defining approach standards for the 
task. It may be necessary and appropriate to establish 
approach corridors and approach speeds. The approach 
standards might mimic a Landing Signal Officer, where an 
unstabilized or botched approach might warrant a “wave-
off” (i.e., trigger an abort) to avoid the possibility of damage 
to an existing lunar habitat. 
5. HANDLING QUALITIES FOR AUTOMATION  
Often, the importance of handling qualities is dismissed 
under the premise that the task/mission objective will be met 
using automated control. In fact, handling qualities or, at 
least, the principles of the pilot-vehicle dynamic systems 
analysis are critically important during automatic control.  
Human-automation interface requirements flow from 
“manual control” handling qualities. Handling qualities are 
the design and evaluation of the pilot-vehicle dynamic 
system (Figure 1); the only fundamental difference between 
“manual control” and “automated control” is the physical 
process of activating the controller (i.e., whether it is a 
human or automation system at the controls). The system 
performance and workload (i.e., handling qualities) during 
this operation are still critically important.  
Human-Centered Automation 
History has shown that the best automation designs are 
human-centered. They are designed understanding the 
human needs and limitations in monitoring, intervention, 
and adaptation with automation.  
Human-centered automation design principles are many and 
varied (e.g., see [44]). Three key principles for human-
automation interaction are directly related to the handling 
qualities process and must be addressed: 
1) The automation must be observable by its human 
operator (i.e., the human operator is appropriately 
informed). 
2) The current and near-term future behaviors of the 
automation must be comprehensible, understood and 
predictable by the human operator.  
3) The automation must be contextually appropriate for 
its application, designed to complement the human 
operator, and not automated just because it is 
possible.  
These human-automation interaction issues are mirrored in 
the lessons-learned from Apollo and their use of automated 
entry guidance and control [45]: 
• “Guidance logic must be simple… the more 
complicated the guidance logic, the more difficult the 
guidance is to monitor during the mission. The 
monitoring difficulty complicates the development of 
the monitoring procedures and increased the time 
required for flight-crew training.”  
• “The guidance logic should be compatible with a 
backup or an alternate trajectory control procedures. 
That is, once an anomaly is detected in the trajectory 
control of the primary guidance system, an alternative 
technique must be available that will allow satisfactory 
trajectory control to be implemented so that the 
spacecraft will land near the originally selected target.” 
• “The interaction between guidance system performance 
and attitude control system performance must be 
recognized. Realistic attitude control system response 
requirements must be established, and guidance-logic 
design must minimize the need for rapid response.”  
HQ Evaluations For Human-Centered Automation 
The handling qualities of automated tasks (i.e., human-
automation interface requirements) should be evaluated in 
three ways: 
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1) Pilots should conduct handling qualities of all tasks to 
be flown by the automation. This is not to imply that 
these tasks could or should be manually flown. But by 
conducting these evaluations, the pilot gains an 
appreciation of what the automation must do to 
successfully control the vehicle. This knowledge is 
critical for understanding the behavior of the 
automation and what the pilot must do in the event 
(likely or unlikely) that they need or want to intervene 
or take-over. This task also defines what information 
(e.g., out-the-window visual cues or displays) are 
needed by the human to monitor, control, or interact 
with the automation. 
2) Classic handling qualities evaluations must also be 
conducted in scenarios where, during the conduct of 
automated tasks, the pilot takes control of the vehicle 
and completes the task or temporarily intervenes and 
then re-engages the automation. This task evaluates the 
ability of the crew to interrupt the automation and the 
potential for upsets or discontinuities in the automation 
during this process. It also demonstrates the pilot’s 
comprehension and understanding of the automation. 
3) Finally, handling qualities evaluations must be 
conducted in scenarios where, during the conduct of 
automated tasks, the automation unexpectedly fails 
(passively or actively) and the pilot must intervene or 
take control of the vehicle and complete the task.  
There has yet to be realized an automation design or 
implementation which is fool-proof and perfect. Adaptive 
automation is a promising, yet immature, technology. 
Manual control of spacecraft is now and will be for the 
foreseeable future desired and/or required to “allow the 
crew to effectively control the spacecraft when necessary 
for mission completion or to prevent a catastrophic event” 
[2]. A human-centered automation design, using “handling 
qualities” principles, ensures that the greatest adaptive 
controller ever designed – the human – can intervene, adapt, 
and overcome as necessary in the event that the automation 
is not successful.  
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A research, development, test, and evaluation process was 
put into effect to identify, understand, and interpret the 
engineering and human factors principles which govern the 
pilot-vehicle dynamic system as they pertain to space 
exploration missions and tasks. Toward this objective, 
piloted simulations were conducted at the NASA Langley 
Research Center and Ames Research Center for earth-orbit 
proximity operations and docking and lunar landing.  
 
These works provide broad guidelines for the design of 
spacecraft to exhibit good handling characteristics. In 
particular, this work demonstrates how handling qualities 
include much more than just stability and control 
characteristics of a spacecraft or aircraft. Handling qualities 
include the motion, visual and aural cues of the vehicle 
response as the pilot performs the required operation or task.  
 
The handling qualities implications of design decisions are 
demonstrated using these pilot-in-the-loop evaluations of 
docking operations and lunar landings. A general trend, 
noted in both proximity operations and docking and lunar 
landing, is that superior handling qualities generally results 
in lower fuel expenditure during the task. Data to support 
control and display requirements are given based on task 
performance and workload. 
 
The importance of handling qualities is sometimes 
dismissed under the premise that the task/mission objectives 
will be met using automated control. It is argued that 
human-automation interface requirements flow from 
“manual control” handling qualities. Therefore, handling 
qualities are still critically important and these principles 
should be closed adhered to.   
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